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Abstract 
Collective skill systems rely on institutional arrangements among a multitude of actors. In Swit-
zerland, occupational associations are responsible for defining the occupations’ training content 
and creating apprenticeship positions. They are important for fostering companies’ contribution 
to VET, representing their members’ interests in the national arena, and working together with 
public authorities to design and implement VET policies. In the aftermath of the Swiss VET 
policy reform of 2004, all occupations needed to be reformed and the number of occupations 
reduced, for example, by creating occupational fields. The increased pedagogical requirements 
and administrative workload put small occupational associations under pressure. However, af-
ter ten years, different outcomes (creation, maintenance, and disruption of occupations) are 
visible. With the theoretical framework of institutional work and based on a qualitative com-
parative case study, this contribution depicts the reform processes of three different occupa-
tional associations and identifies commonalities and differences between the three cases. 
Keywords 
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1 Introduction 
Collective skill systems are vocational education and training (VET) regimes characterised 
by employers’ associations’ involvement in organising training, the provision of portable, cer-
tified occupational skills, and dual training (alternation of school-based learning and work-
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based training) (Trampusch, 2010). They rely on institutional arrangements among a multitude 
of actors (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012). Policy reforms might put these institutional ar-
rangements to a stress test or disrupt them.  
In Switzerland, the Confederation is responsible for vocational law and the enactment of 
training ordinances; the cantons implement the law and supervise vocational schools and host 
companies. Labelled as a “parastate administration” (Linder, 1994, p. 129), public authorities 
have delegated public tasks to private actors. Hence, 155 occupational associations (Organisa-
tionen der Arbeitswelt), which have been identified as key actors for establishing or transform-
ing VET systems (Culpepper, 2003; Thelen, 2004), are responsible for defining the occupa-
tions’ training content and creating apprenticeship positions. In Switzerland, their organisa-
tional form is not regulated. Firms and host companies’ membership is voluntary.  
The Swiss VET system is based on a new VET law, which was enacted in 2004. This VET 
policy reform has been characterised as self-preserving (Trampusch, 2010), meaning that the 
inherited path of the dual VET system was followed. However, it also included various novel-
ties (Bundesrat, 2000; Maurer & Pieneck, 2013). All occupations needed to be reformed, which 
demanded increased pedagogical requirements and administrative workload. Further, one aim 
was to reduce the number of occupations by merging similar ones into occupational fields. This 
should broaden occupational profiles to improve mobility on the labour market. Additionally, 
intercompany courses were required and, to create general binding, sectoral training funds were 
newly possible. 
The reform’s implementation was neither fast nor automatic. To adapt their training regu-
lations to the new law, occupational associations needed to conduct thorough analyses of the 
training content (BBT, 2007). The reform of 300 occupations was closely accompanied by pub-
lic authorities (Berner, 2013). In the end, the number of occupations was reduced to around 
230. However, against expectations, some small occupations were maintained, and new ones 
created.  
Size matters because it is associated with available resources and influence in policy-mak-
ing. The occupational associations’ size is strongly related to the number of apprenticeship po-
sitions they provide. Less than 20 train more than one thousand apprentices per year, whereas 
around 140 are responsible for the remaining 210 occupations. Among them, around 90 occu-
pations are estimated to train less than 100 apprentices annually (Mitterecker, 2016). Together, 
the small occupations provide around 40 per cent of apprenticeship positions (SBFI, 2015) — 
a proportion that is relevant for maintaining the Swiss VET system. 
So far, most studies about the influence of associations in institutional processes have fo-
cussed on influential associations (Micelotta & Washington, 2013; Trampusch, 2010; Wettstein 
et al., 2014). The role of small and less resourceful associations has rarely been studied (Law-
rence et al., 2013). Regarding the Swiss VET reform, small occupational associations found it 
most difficult to implement it owing to their comparatively limited resources. Therefore, this 
contribution addresses a research gap and intends to deepen the understanding of the practices 
of small organisations in changing organisational environments. We address the following re-
search questions: Which different practices did small occupational associations develop to deal 
with the recent Swiss VET reform? How can the diverse outcomes (creation, maintenance, and 
disruption of occupations) be interpreted? 
2 Theoretical framework: Institutional work 
The institutional work perspective (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009, 2011, 
2013) deals with various forms of institutional change and tries to understand the role of actors 
in these processes. It states that institutions need to be purposefully and actively created, main-
tained, and disrupted, and focuses on the knowledgeable, creative, and practical work of indi-
viduals and collective actors attempting to shape institutions.  
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Institutional work involves reflexive awareness and effort. It addresses cultural-cognitive, 
normative, and regulative pillars of institutions (Scott, 2008). Cultural-cognitive elements are 
shared understanding or scripts that guide action. Normative elements include values and 
norms. Regulative institutions consist of rules and regulations. Although it is possible to ana-
lytically distinguish between the three pillars, they are empirically interrelated elements of in-
stitutionalisation. 
An occupation (Beruf) can be conceived of an institution (Lawrence, 2004; Abraham & 
Hinz, 2008). It represents “a systematized combination of formal knowledge, know-how and 
experience, not geared to any single workplace and is bound up with a particular system of 
wage relations” (Clarke et al., 2013, p. 944). It is collectively organised, related to occupational 
labour markets, and needs to be normatively, cultural-cognitively, and legally defined (Nicklich 
& Fortwengel, 2017).  
Institutional work relates creating an institution to institutional entrepreneurship (Eisen-
stadt, 1980; DiMaggio, 1988; Battilana et al., 2009). Institutional entrepreneurs are “organized 
actors who envision new institutions as a means of advancing interests they value highly yet 
that are suppressed by extant logics”. (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006, p. 29) They are individual 
or collective change agents who initiate and implement divergent changes despite pressures 
towards stasis. Divergent changes break with the institutionalised template for organising, 
which is a field’s shared understanding of the aims to be pursued and the appropriate methods 
to be followed.   
From the perspective of institutional work, institutional maintenance is not the uncon-
tested, relatively unproblematic, and taken-for-granted reproduction of institutional order 
(Micelotta & Washington, 2013) but “involves considerable effort, and often occurs as a con-
sequence of change in the organization or its environment” (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 
234). From this point of view, institutions are actively reproduced, and hard work might be 
necessary to ensure their stability. Therefore, it is important to understand how actors can sta-
bilise their practices in changing contexts. Incumbent actors often mobilise resistance against 
regulatory change and try to re-establish the status quo or work to adjust and adapt to inflected 
institutional arrangements.   
Finally, institutional work of disruption refers to deinstitutionalisation, which is a “process 
by which the legitimacy of an established or institutionalized organizational practice erodes or 
discontinues”. (Oliver, 1992, p. 564) In this case, organisations fail to continually reproduce 
previously legitimate or taken-for-granted actions. This might be the case if changes in the 
political field, in government laws and societal values, or functional economic considerations, 
call the legitimacy of a traditional practice into question. Then, deinstitutionalisation might be 
a proactive and conscious response by organisations to changing circumstances or the result of 
environmental changes over which they excerptlittle control and respond only passively or sub-
consciously. 
3 Method: Qualitative comparative case study 
We explore our research question by using a qualitative comparative case study (Merriam, 
2009; Patton, 2005). The aim of case study research is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
phenomenon in question. Therefore, qualitative inquiry typically focuses on relatively small 
and purposefully selected samples.  
Purposeful sampling selects information-rich and illuminative cases that offer useful man-
ifestations of the phenomenon of interest (Patton, 2005). Thus, we purposefully selected three 
information-rich cases in a maximum variation sampling. This kind of sampling strategy allows 
for capturing variation, as well as describing common themes that cut across variation. The 
selection criterion is the maximum heterogeneity of outcomes (creation, maintenance, and dis-
ruption of occupations) after the Swiss VET reform.  
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The cases selected were the associations responsible for the artisanal weaver, cable car 
mechanic, and piano maker occupations. They represent three of the smallest occupations in 
the Swiss VET system and, therefore, allowed for identifying the types of institutional work in 
which small organisations can engage. However, the outcome of their institutional work was 
different. Whereas the cable car association could act as institutional entrepreneurs and create 
new occupations, the weavers maintained theirs against all odds. In contrast, the piano makers 
represented a case of disruption because they could not uphold the legitimacy of retaining their 
individual occupation and needed to merge with similar occupations.  
The case studies were based on document analysis and theory-generating expert interviews 
with key representatives of the occupational associations (Bogner et al., 2009). The analysis of 
the different sources served to reconstruct the occupational reform processes (Langley, 1999). 
In the following, we start with the case of disruption as a most likely case, given the normative 
demands of merging small occupations into occupational fields. Then, we depict a case of un-
expected maintenance, and, finally, a case of creation. 
4 Results 
4.1 Disruption: Case study of the piano makers and tuners 
The case study of the piano makers is an example of disruption because they needed to merge 
with other occupations. Today, musical instrument makers deal with the maintenance, repair, 
construction, and sale of instruments. They were among the first that were reformed, and the 
new apprenticeships started around 2007. In 2016, 12 apprentices started training.  
The state initiated the reform by letting the piano makers know their occupation had been 
identified as too small and, therefore, needed to merge into an occupational field with other 
small occupations working with wood. The concerned occupations had various meetings and 
managed to find a compromise. They formed two sub-groups: instrument makers and 
woodworkers. In this process, the piano makers did not look for alternatives, such as replacing 
the apprenticeship with further education or sending apprentices to a well-known school abroad, 
as they were convinced of the high value of their dual training.   
The various associations also needed to merge into an umbrella organisation of musical 
instrument makers and build a new office. The association of the piano makers still exists today 
as a part of the umbrella organisation and consists of 270 members, all professionals and holders 
of apprenticeship diplomas. Most people who work for the association do so voluntarily or with 
a small remuneration.  
The new association started with the drafting of the regulations. In this process, the public 
authorities forced them to give up their own occupational titles, which was very painful. Even 
today, there is no new occupational identity of musical instrument makers, and the piano makers 
still want to return to their former denomination.   
The piano makers’ association perceived public authorities of the Confederation as inflex-
ible. To increase their influence, they built a political network by choosing a member of parlia-
ment as president.  
The reform’s implementation was costly. The umbrella association created a new office to 
deal with the reform, new pedagogical documents needed to be written and translated into three 
national languages, and a national training centre had to be established.   
Only after visiting twelve locations did the association successfully find a place for the 
training centre. This was a VET school for agriculture, which faced a lack of apprentices, and 
the responsible canton was interested in filling the void with the musical instrument makers. 
Additionally, the new training regulations foresaw inter-company courses that needed new ma-
chines and materials. Only by mobilising personal networks did they acquire sponsors and 
could finance the equipment.   
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Financing the training centre and the umbrella organisation increased costs. Therefore, new 
modes for financing needed to be developed. One solution was to introduce a general binding 
sectoral training fund. Now, every firm active in repairing or building musical instruments 
needs to pay into it, whether it trains or not. As this is a sector with few firms, they need to pay 
comparatively large fees. This resulted in conflicts, for example, the cancellation of member-
ships. There was even a lawsuit with a professional who refused to pay. The court decided in 
favour of the association, which was perceived as an important step in stabilising the new fi-
nancial mode.  
4.2 Maintenance: Case study of the artisanal weavers  
The weavers’ occupational association maintained their small occupation (Strebel et al., 2018). 
Today, artisanal weavers design and weave fabrics on looms for clothing, accessories, and 
home textiles. In 2016, nine people started training. The occupational association consists of 
360 members who are mostly individual VET diploma holders. The members’ participation in 
working groups is mostly voluntary and barely remunerated.  
The VET reform was perceived as an existential threat because of the seemingly high re-
quirements for updating training regulations. Especially, the timeframe of five years to update 
regulations was too short, and the association lacked resources for drafting a new ordinance. 
Simultaneously, cantonal authorities closed down a VET school that provided weekly VET 
courses in weaving and a number of school-based apprenticeship positions.   
At first, the weavers complied with the public administration’s requirement to merge with 
others. They evaluated to create an occupational field with similar occupations. However, in 
the end, they did not find an occupation with which they could merge.  
Instead, the weavers’ association evaluated alternative solutions for training (nationwide-
recognised continuous education certificates or individualised continuing education) and even 
the possibility of abandoning its apprenticeship. In the end, they decided to maintain their ap-
prenticeship. This decision was justified as follows: Inquiries showed their VET diploma hold-
ers were successfully integrated into the labour markets and their practical skills were valued. 
Further, a VET certificate guaranteed a certain wage level for weavers, which might not be the 
case with other certificates.   
After cantonal authorities intervened in favour of the weavers and federal authorities ex-
tended the deadline for VET reform, the weavers decided to maintain their apprenticeship and 
engage in the reform process in 2007. While defining new curricula, new elements were intro-
duced. More weight was given to design, training in customer service, and sales. Moreover, the 
name of the occupation was changed, and more school days were introduced, which increased 
training costs.   
Implementing the new ordinance was demanding, as pedagogical materials needed to be 
developed for the newly created inter-company courses and workplace trainers and exam ex-
perts had to be trained. The weavers’ association, owing to its limited resources, needed to 
mobilise voluntary member support to fulfil these tasks.   
To mobilise voluntary member support and encourage firms to provide apprenticeship po-
sitions, the association used mechanisms such as valorisation and demonisation to foster com-
pliance. Members who voluntarily contributed to the implementation were rewarded through 
social events and the provision of free further training opportunities. Their contribution was 
regularly praised in the association’s publications. Contrarily, people that did not join events 
were mentioned as negative counter-examples. Further, they used informal channels and face-
to-face meetings that proved to be best-suited for persuasion and consensus-finding. Concern-
ing the participation of host companies in training, the association actively promoted exchange 
and consensus finding by creating forums for informal exchange and by fostering networks 
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among members and host companies. It is in such forums and networks that informal group 
pressure was used to foster compliance.  
4.3 Creation: Case study of the cable car mechanics  
Surprisingly, the cable car association created new occupations and acted as an institutional 
entrepreneur in a time when the number of occupations was to be reduced. Today, cable car 
mechanics are responsible for maintaining and servicing of cable cars. In 2016, 35 people 
started with the new apprenticeship.  
The cable car association is a long-standing employer association that employs staff and 
has a high degree of organisation and a well-established network with 388 member firms. Be-
fore creating their apprenticeships, there only existed a continuous education format for gradu-
ates of other occupations, further qualifying them as certified cable car specialists.   
In the early 2000s, the occupational association developed the idea of creating a new ap-
prenticeship. They argued that diploma holders from other occupations were no longer suited 
to deal with complex cable car technology and mere technicians often lacked customer service 
skills. Therefore, they wanted to create two apprenticeships integrating elements of various 
occupations (electrician, mechanical engineer, motor mechanic) and add training in tourism-
related subjects. Because they expected to train only a few apprentices, they planned to create 
a new training centre. In 2003, the results of a member survey showed that up to 60 firms were 
ready to train apprentices and most supported the centre’s creation.   
In 2004, the public administration granted permission to start drafting training regulations. 
In particular, the association convinced public authorities that their skill requirements could not 
be met by other occupations, the number of companies was sufficiently high to offer appren-
ticeships and a labour market for the future cable car mechanics, and that they provided per-
spectives for youth in mountain regions.   
To implement the new regulations, the association created its own training centre. With 
this decision, they limited risk for the cantonal authorities, which are legally responsible for the 
school-based part of VET. The association financed the development of training regulations 
and the centre through various sources: a newly created, non-compulsory branch fund, addi-
tional funding to support economic development in mountain regions, and contributions from 
private foundations. This gave them more autonomy from the cantons, as well as the full finan-
cial risk because the cantons sending apprentices would only contribute to the costs of voca-
tional school courses. Further, the association found a location for the new training centre in a 
mountain municipality, who wanted to revive its local economy. Finally, in 2006, the associa-
tion started training new apprentices.   
However, although the association prepared their firms with information about training, 
trained future workplace trainers, and monitored the firms, implementing training proved to be 
difficult. Particularly challenging was the financing of the training centre, gaining host compa-
nies, and finding apprentices.   
The decision to organise courses in an association-led training centre had important finan-
cial consequences. It created an incentive structure for member firms to engage in training. If 
they were not offering sufficient apprenticeship positions, their association had to cover the 
financial deficit. Initial calculations had foreseen at least 20 apprentices annually, so the train-
ing centre would become self-supporting. Faced with a low number of apprentices, the associ-
ation needed to take measures for their project to survive. The focus now clearly shifted away 
from actual firm needs towards having enough apprentices to financially self-sustain the train-
ing centre.   
Among others, they successfully negotiated an agreement with the cantons to increase their 
contributions for the initial years. They also increased normative pressure on companies. An-
other explanation for the low number of apprentices was the lack of visibility and social 
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recognition of the new occupations. Therefore, the association engaged in occupational mar-
keting to attract school-leavers. Finally, when the first graduates became cable car specialists, 
they could start training apprentices on their own, which facilitated further institutionalisation 
of training in firms. 
5 Preliminary conclusion 
The selected cases depict practices developed by small occupational associations to deal with 
the recent VET policy reform in Switzerland. However, there were three different outcomes. 
Whereas the piano makers could no longer legitimise an independent occupation and needed to 
merge with others, the weavers maintained their occupation. Further, the occupation of cable 
car mechanics was created in an institutional environment, in which the number of occupations 
was to be reduced.   
Comparing the three cases allows for identifying the following commonalities. They show 
that creating, maintaining, and disrupting occupations requires effort and demands that associ-
ations conduct cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative institutional work. None of the de-
picted processes has been easy or smooth. Without active collective actors and their institutional 
work, those occupations would not have been created, maintained, or—even in the case of de-
institutionalisation as a single occupation—upheld as a specialisation within a broader appren-
ticeship scheme. They needed to invest in cultural-cognitive (i.e., theorising skill deficiencies 
and the need for apprenticeships and new training centres), normative (i.e., increased normative 
pressure on companies to train and create an attractive image of the new occupation), and reg-
ulative (i.e., drafting training ordinances and curricula and creating branch funds) institutional 
work. Often, voluntarily working individuals or smaller groups were key to success. This high 
engagement can be interpreted as being normatively driven. These actors have been convinced 
of the high value of dual apprenticeships, which can also be interpreted as a deeply anchored 
cultural template in Switzerland.  
Further, the provision of the occupations was not functionally necessary owing to immedi-
ate labour market needs. In every case, alternative training opportunities existed, such as on-
the-job training, continuous education within or outside the VET system, or training opportu-
nities in neighbour countries. These occupations exist today as a result of the inventive and 
strategic institutional work of collective actors who were able to position themselves within the 
new legal framework. As the cases show, labour market needs were actively constructed and 
argued with towards members and external stakeholders.  
Preliminary results, which still need to be further elaborated on, show functional differ-
ences in the following dimensions: dealing with members (coercion versus valorisation/demon-
isation), funding (voluntary or obligatory branch funds versus mere member fees), negotiating 
with public administrations (for example co-optation of politicians), organisation (profession-
alised or relying on voluntary work), and timing of the reform process.  
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